BUNKER-051 – từ phía trong vành đai sân bay nhìn ra ngoài QL1, nay là đường Trường Chinh
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Tet, 1968
BUNKER-051
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Tet, January 31st, 1968, the beginning of the Lunar New Year: The Year of the Monkey. It is by far the most important Vietnamese holiday of the year, yet Westerners cannot possibly comprehend its significance. Tet is Christmas, Thanksgiving, the Fourth of July, and your birthday all rolled into one.
During the evening of January 30th, a large VC force infiltrated the Vinatexco textile factory across Highway One from Tan Son Nhut. At 0300 hours the following morning, the western side of the base, which housed the command for MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) came under attack from three VC battalions; the 267th, the 269th and the 271st. They also launched attacks against the north and southeast gates. The western perimeter was breached and the communist forces reached the runway.
We were defended by the 377th Security Police Squadron, the ARVN 52nd Regional Force Battalion and “two platoons from the 69th Signal Battalion”. Sgt Lazlo Borross and Sp4 Neal died defending their positions. The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Col. Glenn K. Otis was responsible for driving the VC back into the textile mill, which was then leveled by air strikes.
At 1732 hours, 30 January 1968, the 377th Security Police Squadron was placed in Security Alert Condition RED (Option I) by order of the Commander, Seventh Air Force. The Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC) tried to confirm the unilateral Air Force Security Condition RED (Option I) through U.S. Army channels with negative results. All forces within the TSNSA remained in Security Alert Condition White except the 377th Security Police Squadron and Task Force 35, which were in Condition RED, and all other TSN Defense Forces which were in Condition YELLOW.
Intelligence sources reflect that an estimated nine enemy battalions were in the greater Saigon Area, and at least seven of them were involved in the attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The enemy battalions in the greater Saigon area were augmented and supported by approximately twelve identified companies or larger-size elements of the 5th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.
Heavy pressure from enemy elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion and the 2nd Local Force Battalion was exerted on the Joint General Staff Headquarters, located adjacent to the southeast perimeter of the installation, and a subsequent penetration by these units was made through the southeast perimeter fence of JGS.
Heavy small arms fire was directed towards Gate #2 by unconfirmed enemy elements. These elements were probably assigned to the 2nd Local Force Battalion and the C-10 Sapper Battalion.
Enemy elements, probably from the 6th Local Force Battalion and the C-10 Sapper Battalion, assaulted the south entry control point of the MACV Annex, approximately 250 meters southeast of the base perimeter fence. This enemy force is estimated to have been a reinforced company (200+).
Enemy forces estimated at four reinforced battalions mounted an offensive against the west perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The units involved and their probable tactical deployment are indicated below. The three principal, battalion-size units were positioned in column at the time of the assault.
Elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion approached the fence line via Lambretta taxi on National Highway #1. The sapper elements dismounted the vehicle and detonated what is believed to have been a Bangalore Torpedo on the fence line. The explosion opened a section of the outer perimeter fence, and the breach was used continuously by the enemy forces for entry onto the installation. The same elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion remained with the initial assault force and penetrated the perimeter. The staging area of the sapper element was in the vicinity of Phu Cuong Village, approximately fifteen Kilometers north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
The 267th Viet Cong Battalion (Main Force) composed of approximately 25 per cent NVA, was the lead battalion and the major assault force in the penetration of the west perimeter. This battalion, like all of the attacking battalions, had a strength of 450 to 500 men. Members of this unit made the deepest penetration into the installation. Its staging area was approximately six Kilometers south of Due Hoa Village, approximately eighteen Kilometers west of the base.
The 16th Battalion, Viet Cong (Main Force) AKA D-16 (NVA), was the second unit in line of the assaulting forces. Numerous KIA from this unit were identified inside and immediately outside the perimeter fence. It is probable that this battalion was co-located with or at least in close proximity to the 267th Battalion identified in paragraph (a) above, since the delineation of their lines could not be clearly identified and their dead were co-mingled. The greatest proportion of this unit was NVA.
The 269th Viet Cong Battalion (Main Force) was the rear unit in line. It’s bivouac area prior to the attack was in the immediate area of Duc Hoa. This unit was engaged from its eastern and southern flank by elements of the 53rd Regional Forces Battalion prior to their arrival at the perimeter fence.
The 90th Battalion of the 1st NVA (Cover Number KB-604) Regiment was located in the VINATEXCO factory northwest of the breached perimeter fence. This battalion had 12 mortar positions to the immediate north, west and south of the factory and probably rendered support fire to the assault forces often referred to by interrogated prisoners. This unit sustained 170(+) KIA primarily during the air attack on the factory during the day of 31 January 1968. It has been reported by Vietnamese intelligence sources that among the many casualties in the factory there were 7 NVA pilots and 15 NVA aircraft technicians.
Upon implementation of Condition RED (Option I), three platoons of U.S. Army personnel (Task Force 35, 69th Signal Bn.) were alerted and placed on five-minute standby status as augmentation reserve forces for the 377th Security Police Squadron. These platoons, composed of 30 men each, were immediately placed under the operational control of the Commander, 377th Security Police Squadron, in accordance with published and approved base defense plans.
The attack came without notice, and the size and firepower of the enemy units were without precedence for a major USAF installation in RVN. The squadron had been placed in Security Condition GREY on the morning of 30 January in response to the increase hostile activity during the TET “truce,” and General Momyer, the commander of Seventh Air Force, had placed all of his bases in RVN on Security Condition RED at 1730 hours that afternoon as a result of rocket and mortar attacks on a number of other installations the night before. But, except for vague, general reports that the Viet Cong would probably attempt some type of attack on Tan Son Nhut some time before or during the TET holidays, there was no firm indication of the type or size of attack which the Viet Cong could or would launch. Nor was there any firm intelligence concerning when or from what direction an attack, if any, was coming.*
The first such indication that something big was underway came at 0300 hours on 31 January when a report was received at JDOC that the American embassy in Saigon was under attack. A few moments later, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff compound was also reported under attack, and at 0320 hours, the first rounds fell on the east end of Tan Son Nhut near the POL area. But it wasn’t until 0333 hours—when mortar and rocket rounds started to hit the west end near the 051 gate and Viet Cong troops appeared from the tree line–that the 377th Security Police Squadron knew from where the major attack was coming or had any indication concerning its size.
The squadron responded immediately with all the resources at its command. The men had been placed on five-minute alert when the squadron went into Condition RED earlier in the evening, and when the first rounds landed near the POL area, the quick reaction teams were readied for immediate deployment.
Next, three 13-man QRTs and one platoon of Task Force 35 (30-man platoons of Army augmentees of 69th Signal Bn., under the operational control of the 377th Security Police Squadron) were dispatched to the west end to form a blocking force directly east of the advancing Viet Cong penetration force, and another Task Force 35-man platoon was sent to bolster the southeast flank. These units formed the main defensive line just east of the western most crossover taxiway north and south of the main runway. They were ordered to return the enemy fire and hold their positions.
By this time, an estimated 600 Viet Cong–one reinforced battalion augmented sapper and NVA units–had penetrated through the breach in the perimeter fence. this main assault force was armed with or supported by RPG2 and RPG7 rockets, 81mm mortars, .50 caliber machine guns, hand grenades, automatic weapons, small arms, and other miscellaneous weaponry. Although outnumbered at least four to one and facing superior firepower, the Security Policemen and augmentees maintained steady, well-disciplined fire and blunted the Viet Cong penetration.
Meanwhile, Lt Col Carter, back at JDOC, deployed the other QRTs to reinforce perimeter defenses in the northwest, north, northeast, east, Main Gate, Gate 2, and south sections of the perimeter; held the third (and last) platoon of Task Force 35 in reserve at CSC in the event of a Viet Cong breakthrough; and worked feverishly with U.S. Army and Air Force counterparts to secure air, artillery, armor, and infantry support for his beleaguered Security Policemen.
Fire support was requested from U.S. Army helicopter light fire teams (LFTs), but clearance was delayed for approximately 45 minutes because the LFTs were unable to distinguish between friendly and enemy positions. A platoon of three Vietnamese light tanks arrived at approximately 0500 hours, but within 15 minutes two of them were destroyed by enemy rocket fire and the third was forced to withdraw. The Vietnamese field commander, Major Chieu, was wounded when one of the tanks was hit. At this time, the Vietnamese commander of JDOC, Lt Col Coung, turned over his command to Lt Col Bernard L. Garred Jr., U.S. Senior Advisor to the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive area. A short time before, around 0430 hours, forward air controllers (FACs) reported a very large Viet Cong force in the fields directly west of the 051 Bunker and 051 gate. This was later identified in post-attack intelligence as two reinforced battalions totaling 900-1000 men. At 0523 hours, friendly artillery received clearance and began taking a heavy toll on these forces outside the perimeter fence.
During this period and for the next hour, the battle on the west end of the base was a standoff. The defense forces kept up a constant but well-disciplined fire on the hostile positions, keeping the Viet Cong pinned down and unable to advance. But, although two companies of Vietnamese airborne arrived to reinforce the defense line, the friendly forces had neither the firepower nor the manpower to counterattack and drive the attackers off the base.
At approximately 0600-0615 hours, however, the fire from the Viet Cong positions became extremely intense, and the FACs reported that the Viet Cong in the field to the west of the perimeter were starting to advance toward the base. The defensive forces braced themselves, returned the fire, and held their positions.
About 0630 hours “C” Troop of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (3/4 Cav) of the 25th division (less one platoon), which had been placed under the operational control of JDOC, was sighted coming down Highway 1 from the north towards the 051 gate. Although it suffered heavy casualties in an ambush from a row of houses just north and west of the gate, the troop pushed through and hit the Viet Cong on the north flank, distracting their attention from the Security Police main defense line. The defensive forces and particularly the 3/4 Cav unit remained heavily engaged with the enemy forces for the next hour. At approximately 0730 hours, “B” Troop of the 3/4 Cav (plus the remaining platoon of “C” Troop) entered the 055 gate at the northwest tip of the base, sped down the outer perimeter road, and hit the Viet Cong from the north. At this time, the Viet Cong again increased the intensity of their fire, apparently to cover the withdrawal of the units inside the base perimeter.
The pressure somewhat relieved, the 377th Security Police Squadron and the other defensive forces inside the base counterattacked from the east, driving the Viet Cong off the base, while the 3/4 Cav units continued to press the attack on the north flank. The Security Police and Vietnamese Airborne forces met stiff resistance, particularly on the south part of their counterattack line and from the 051 Bunker, which had been overrun and occupied early in the battle. By 1000 hours, however, most of the Viet Cong had been killed or driven off, except for the pocket of resistance in the 051 Bunker. The bunker was finally neutralized by grenade fire, assaulted, and taken by Security Police forces at 1215 hours.
February was bad. Tan Son Nhut was pounded hard on the 18th by over a sixty 122mm rockets. Five men were killed, one-hundred-and-fifty-one wounded. We were hit again on the 20th, and on the 26th we had four more killed and thirty-five wounded. We were rocketed a few more times that month but during March and April it quieted down. Around the first part of May rumors of another impending large-scale attack started circulating. Two NVA battalions were moving in and preparing to attack Saigon and TSN.
Attempts to locate hidden enemy arsenals and launch areas were fairly successful. Had it been otherwise, the outcome of Tet would have been a rather different story. The directional information was, of course, extremely useful to the searchers. Stars and Stripes reported that on that day alone, forty-six crew-served and 216 individual weapons were seized.
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