{"id":215043,"date":"2022-01-30T09:36:01","date_gmt":"2022-01-30T07:36:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire\/"},"modified":"2022-01-30T09:36:01","modified_gmt":"2022-01-30T07:36:01","slug":"eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire\/","title":{"rendered":"Eritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire"},"content":{"rendered":"<div><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire.jpg\" class=\"ff-og-image-inserted\"><\/div>\n<p>The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia\u2019s Tigray region since the conflict broke out <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-africa-54964378\">in November 2020<\/a>. Eritrea shares a <a href=\"https:\/\/sovereignlimits.com\/boundaries\/eritrea-ethiopia-land\">1,000 km border with Ethiopia<\/a>, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front.<\/p>\n<p>These actions have both prolonged and worsened the hugely <a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/horn-africa\/ethiopia\/b171-ethiopias-tigray-war-deadly-dangerous-stalemate#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%E2%80%99s%20Tigray%20War%3A%20A%20Deadly%2C%20Dangerous%20Stalemate%20Both,the%20war%20zone%2C%20while%20maintaining%20pressure%20for%20talks.\">destructive conflict<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p>Eritrea\u2019s involvement also has wider implications. It represents an attempt by Asmara to reassert itself on the regional stage, following two decades of relative diplomatic isolation.<\/p>\n<p>The large-scale commitment of soldiers \u2013 as well as logistical and political support for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed \u2013 is the result of a remarkable turnaround in relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa. After almost two decades of hostility, Abiy struck a peace deal with Eritrea\u2019s Isaias Afwerki in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/international-legal-materials\/article\/joint-declaration-of-peace-and-friendship-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia\/76C651A25602F6DF3E2D62B01BC5984E\">July 2018 <\/a>. This appeared to usher in a new era of stability and cooperation. <\/p>\n<p>But that\u2019s not what transpired. In the following months, Abiy intensified his programme of political reform in Ethiopia. He <a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/horn-africa\/ethiopia\/269-managing-ethiopias-unsettled-transition\">consolidated his power<\/a> at the expense of the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front. The movement had <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hurstpublishers.com\/book\/understanding-contemporary-ethiopia\/\">dominated politics in Ethiopia since 1991<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The front was also Eritrea\u2019s bitterest enemy. There had been a troubled history of relations between it and the Eritrean People\u2019s Liberation Front dating back to the 1970s. This antagonism culminated in a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/0384AC30F3C8F59E15F88AE823623DA7\/S000197200009166Xa.pdf\/old_problems_in_new_conflicts_some_observations_on_eritrea_and_its_relations_with_tigray_from_liberation_struggle_to_interstate_war.pdf\">between 1998 and 2000<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The outbreak of the war in Tigray served a number of purposes for Isaias. Firstly, it gave him the opportunity to end Eritrea\u2019s long-standing international isolation. It did this by enabling him to exercise influence in a conflict which threatened to completely destabilise the region. This was a deeply worrying prospect to a range of international actors.<\/p>\n<p>Secondly, it reasserted his influence in Ethiopia\u2019s internal affairs. <\/p>\n<p>And lastly it provided an opportunity to seek revenge on the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front. The front\u2019s leadership outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily in the 1998-2000 war. It also outmanoeuvred Eritrea diplomatically in the years following the conflict.<\/p>\n<h2>Eritrea\u2019s opportunistic policy<\/h2>\n<p>The government in Asmara has pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. Its aim has essentially been to gain regional superiority at <a href=\"https:\/\/libcat.simmons.edu\/Record\/b2158131\/TOC\">Ethiopia\u2019s<\/a> expense. <\/p>\n<p>Eritrea has sought to exercise leverage by getting involved in others\u2019 conflicts. For much of the 2000s and 2010s, for instance, Asmara defied the international consensus on Somalia. This consensus was primarily orchestrated by the government in Ethiopia, at the time led by the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front. Reaching the consensus involved the creation of a Transitional Federal Government with broad international support. <\/p>\n<p>Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers, supported in the air by the US, launched offensives against al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group which Eritrea was accused of supporting.<\/p>\n<p>This led to the 2009 imposition of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/press\/en\/2009\/sc9833.doc.htm\">sanctions on Eritrea<\/a>. There were also interventions in Darfur and eastern Sudan by the Eritrean government.<\/p>\n<p>Eritrea\u2019s regional policy has largely been influenced by Ethiopia, its much more powerful southerly neighbour. But Ethiopia has represented both an obstacle and an opportunity in the pursuit of regional dominance. <\/p>\n<p>In many respects, the single biggest obstacle facing the Eritrean People\u2019s Liberation Front regime in Asmara is a strong, united Ethiopia. A country capable of dominating the region in economic, military and diplomatic terms \u2013 and especially one covertly or overtly hostile to Eritrea itself. This was the case under the Ethiopian People\u2019s Revolutionary Democratic Front <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/sites\/default\/files\/public\/Research\/Africa\/bpethiopiaeritrea.pdf\">regime<\/a> led by the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front. <\/p>\n<p>A weakened and disunited Ethiopia \u2013 with at least some political actors who are easy to influence \u2013 therefore represents an opportunity for Eritrea\u2019s interests. This is because the Eritrean People\u2019s Liberation Front\u2019s vision for the country is as regional gatekeeper and pivot \u2013 secure in itself, cohesive and militarily potent. <\/p>\n<p>In search of that status, the best scenario is to have Ethiopia unstable enough to allow opportunities for intervention and influence. Asmara would also want to be able to justify prolonged militarisation, which has become the hallmark of independent Eritrean nationhood. But, it wants to avoid Ethiopia\u2019s total collapse. <\/p>\n<p>Asmara\u2019s best-case scenario is a prolonged, unresolved conflict in Ethiopia in which the presence of Eritrean forces and political support are still required by Addis Ababa. <\/p>\n<p>Abiy\u2019s assent to power and the marginalisation of the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front \u2013 combined with widespread and growing political protest in the preceding years \u2013 presented just such an opportunity. <\/p>\n<h2>Risky strategy<\/h2>\n<p>But this is a risky strategy. <\/p>\n<p>Isaias has essentially harnessed his cause to that of Abiy. When things were going well against the Tigrayan forces \u2013 as in late 2020 and early 2021 \u2013 it looked like a justifiable policy, however catastrophic for the civilian population. But it could backfire. <\/p>\n<p>There have been signs that negotiations between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership may be <a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/horn-africa\/ethiopia\/rare-chance-peace-ethiopia#:%7E:text=A%20Rare%20Chance%20for%20Peace%20in%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%E2%80%99s,should%20step%20up%20to%20provide%20support%20for%20talks.\">possible<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p>If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias\u2019 removal from discussions over Ethiopia\u2019s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated. This would take him back to the pariah status he has occupied for most of the last two <a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/horn-africa\/eritrea\/eritrea-siege-state\">decades<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p>Further, in the longer term, an Ethiopia where various parties are reconciled to one another\u2019s legitimacy could once again become a hostile entity on Eritrea\u2019s southern flank. <\/p>\n<p>Involvement in other people\u2019s wars is inherently risky business. The Eritrean People\u2019s Liberation Front regime has frequently played with fire. It has done so domestically and regionally. Yet, to date, it has seemingly defied geopolitical gravity.<\/p>\n<p>But the Eritrean army\u2019s disproportionately violent and inhumane intervention in Ethiopia in pursuit of payback against the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front and the regional stature Isaias has long craved could result in the most destructive blowback imaginable: a coalescence of Ethiopian antagonists and domestic opposition that presents an existential threat to the Eritrean government itself.<\/p>\n<p> <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/africa\/\">Source: The Conversation<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia\u2019s Tigray region since the conflict broke out in November 2020. Eritrea shares a 1,000 km border with Ethiopia, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front. These actions [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":215044,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[4584],"tags":[3257],"class_list":{"0":"post-215043","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-africa-news-2","8":"tag-mypr","9":"entry"},"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire.jpg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/215043","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=215043"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/215043\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/215044"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=215043"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=215043"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.myza.co.za\/press\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=215043"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}